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The Fundamental Tension Between Market
Wages for Women and Comparable Worth
M. Neil Browne*
Introduction
The division of rights and income among different groups
of workers is a source of persistent dispute. Granting a particu-
lar income to individual A often results in individuals B and C
having either reduced or nonexistent income in later periods.'
Given this inherent conflict in the distribution of income, cer-
tain elements of society aggressively protect the existing pat-
tern of distribution,2 while other elements protest systematic
inequity. Comparable worth actions constitute one modern
mechanism for women to oppose existing market wages. 3 The
comparable worth doctrine suggests that the most pervasive
and persistent inequity in employment compensation systems
is generated by gender discrimination.4
Opponents of comparable worth claims typically respond
with the explicit or implicit assumption that existing markets
distribute resources better than any other available means.5 In
brief, these opponents argue that the market automatically and
accurately determines the relative worth of individual male and
female workers.6 The theoretical basis for this reliance on mar-
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1. A firm, like an economy, has a limited amount of potential income to
distribute among its workers. Thus, increasing the income of any person or
group reduces the capacity of a firm or economy to pay income to others.
2. See Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell LQ. 8, 13
(1927). Property law does more than simply protect possessions; it, like wage
regulation, establishes the framework on which future income flows will be
based.
3. See Barbara Norris, Comparable Worth, Disparate Impact and the Mar-
ket Rate Salary Problem, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 730 (1983); Carol Pint, Value, Work
and Women, 1 Law & Inequality 159 (1983). Both articles succinctly discuss the
evolution of comparable worth actions and statutes.
4. Arguments concerning the doctrine are summarized in a relatively com-
prehensive fashion in Michael Gold, A Dialogue on Comparable Worth (1983).
5. See David Gregory, Comparable Wort&- The Demise of the Disparate Im-
pact Theory of Liability, 1982 Det. C.L Rev. 853, 898.
6. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Lemons v. City
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ket optimality is neoclassical economic theory. Proponents of
this market defense tend to exaggerate the advantages of cur-
rent market decisionmaking and almost categorically reject the
capability of rational groups to create an efficient compensation
pattern through collective negotiation. They see legal or polit-
ical distributional alternatives to the market as subjective, bu-
reaucratic, non-operational, and susceptible to capricious
manipulation.
In part, the market defense achieves its intellectual appeal
because of an unstated faith that a free and fair market is al-
ready dispensing incomes. 7 Additionally, people who advocate
the superiority of market mechanisms necessarily adopt cer-
tain assumptions describing the characteristics of the setting in
which markets function. The market theory of wages, then, op-
erates freely and fairly only within a world having these as-
sumed characteristics. If a person's income is determined in a
context not closely approximating these characteristics, the
theory is inapplicable. In such a case, the market defense to
existing wage differentials becomes a shallow attempt to pre-
serve a male-dominated social structure.8
This paper explores the assumptive underpinnings of the
market defense. An understanding of these assumptions alerts
those responding to the defense to its vulnerability. The first
section of the paper, Part I, enumerates the assumptions made
by those who use the market defense. The analysis explores
the role each assumption plays in validating market outcomes
as voluntary, efficient, and fair. Part II argues that neoclassical
market theory, and its underlying assumptions, do not reflect
the reality of the marketplace. This part explores alternative
labor market theories without neoclassical assumptions, expos-
ing a far more complex, and real, labor market than that as-
sumed by neoclassical doctrine. This discussion exhibits the
polymorphic nature of the abstraction called "the market." Fi-
of Denver, 17 F.E.P. Cases 906, 914 (D. CoL 1978), a'd 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat. Bank of
Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Equal EmpL Opport. Com'n v. Ak-
ron Nat. Bank, 497 F. Supp. 733, 751 (N.D. Ohio 1980). These cases represent
instances where courts took judicial notice of "economic realities" in deciding
that the market wage provided a satisfactory measure of a worker's value.
7. See Sar Levitan, Garth Mangum & Ray Marshall, Human Resources and
Labor Markets 97 (3d ed. 1981).
8. See Cotton Lindsay, Equal Pay for Comparable Work: An Economic
Analysis of a New Antidiscrimination Doctrine 4-16 (1980) (relatively clear ex-
position of neoclassical labor market theory, the technical argument for the
market defense).
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nally, this paper concludes that the very real complexity of the
labor market undercuts the usefulness of neoclassical theory as
the basis for legal arguments concerning relative wages. Since
the market defense is based upon unrealistic neoclassical as-
sumptions, the market defense lacks substance as a defense
against comparable worth claims.
I. Assumptions of Neoclassical Theory
A. Standards of Judgment
Before one can critically analyze the assumptions underly-
ing neoclassical market theory, one must establish the stan-
dards by which the market theory is judged superior. When an
analyst urges acceptance of the market as the proper arbiter of
income patterns, the analyst, at least implicitly, rejects alterna-
tive distributional mechanisms such as collective bargaining,
judicial rulings, or legislative regulation. Markets are judged
superior to other mechanisms by the following standards:
1. Freedom. Markets are said to maximize voluntary ex-
changes among participants, enhancing the freedom of
each participant.9
2. Efficiency. Markets are said to channel the resources
of society into their most productive uses, maximizing
society's gross national product.
3. Equity. Markets are said to assure equitable treat-
ment among participants because market participants
receive income only to the extent of their productivity
and not on the basis of sex, race, or social status.
The specific process by which the market allegedly attains
these criteria is rarely made explicit. Instead, those people
who endorse market outcomes tend to link markets with free-
dom, efficiency, and equity almost as if the relationship were
absolutely certain.O0
This reflexive idealization of market outcomes stems from
several attitudes. First, many of us distrust the ability of the
human intellect to solve problems. We may channel this dis-
trust into a preference for having intricate decisions, like who
gets what income, made by impersonal market mechanisms.
Second, each of us is aware of the tragic mistakes made by gov-
9. See Duncan Foley, Problems vs. Conflicts: Economic Theory and Ideol-
ogy, 65 Amer. Econ. Rev. 231, 232 (1975) (discussion of the complexity inherent
in labeling a situation "voluntary").
10. See, e.g., Joel Kaplan & Richard Lieberman, Comparable Pay: A Man-
agement Perspective, 7 Equal EmpL Opp. Today 145, 147-51 (1980).
Law and Inequality
ernments in the name of the public interest or other high-
sounding moral virtue. Finally, we may assume that individu-
als are inherently inert and rapacious. Consequently, any non-
governmental but impersonal mechanism, such as "the mar-
ket," that promises to stimulate productive effort and somehow
to control the natural tendency of individuals toward self-ag-
grandizement appears highly attractive."1
Defenders continually describe markets as impersonal.
Such a characterization is highly convenient for those who
have a disproportionate influence on the determination of rela-
tive wages. Market defenders cite "the laws of supply and de-
mand" as the determinants of what the proper gap between the
income of a surgeon and a nurse both is and should be. These
laws supposedly result from objective forces beyond individu-
als' control. Consequently, income differentials are calibrated
not by a person who could conceivably be a misogynist, racist,
homophobe, or ignoramus, but by forces that work mysteri-
ously and automatically to make appropriate monetary distinc-
tions.12 In contrast to the allegedly impersonal market,
legislators and judges are perceived as powerful individuals
with a potential for abusing their authority. Market proponents
also argue that legislative or judicial intervention in resulting
wage decisions is a clumsy and burdensome interference with
impersonal processes. 13
Defenders of market wages claim that markets stimulate
productivity, while simultaneously regulating individual selfish-
ness in the public interest.14 Since sellers of labor (workers)
earn income only if they offer productive labor in the market,
income differences theoretically stimulate workers to offer the
type and quantity of labor desired by producers.15 Under the
neoclassical theory of supply and demand, producers respond
to consumer demand by adjusting the quantity of goods pro-
duced to meet the quanity of goods desired. Because produc-
tion of goods is inherently a function of labor and materials,
11. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 73, 324, 421 (1776); Francis Edge-
worth, Mathematical Physics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to
the Moral Sciences 16 (1881).
12. See Economics: An Anti-Text 94 (Francis Green & Petter Nore eds.
1977).
13. See Robert Solo, The Positive State 1-57 (1982) (thorough discussion of
the negative connotation assigned to governmental action by neoclassical eco-
nomic theory).
14. E.K. Hunt, Property and Prophets: The Evolution of Economic Institu-
tions and Ideologies 42-43 (4th ed. 1981).
15. Lindsay, supra note 8, at 10.
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consumer demand indirectly determines the type and amount
of labor demanded by producers. If, at the given wage, a
shortage of labor exists (that is, demand for labor is greater
than supply), wage increases will stimulate otherwise inert
workers to transfer their energies to types of work and loca-
tions where they are needed. The worker's own selfishness
propels her toward socially useful tasks, thus diffusing the po-
tentially negative social consequences of an uncontrolled re-
lease of personal selfishness.16
One may wonder how these market interactions between
employee and employer are conducive to freedom, efficiency,
and equity. Freedom, supposedly, is enhanced because no one
is forced to work for a particular employer, for a particular
wage, or in a particular occupation or location. Employees vol-
untarily exchange their labor for a pre-announced amount of
money.17 When the ongoing exchange becomes unsatisfactory
to either party, the employee quits or the employer fires the
employee. Mobility of labor guarantees that employers will not
be able to maintain wage differentials that employee behavior
has not implicitly sanctioned. Thus, wages appear to be the
price at which both the buyer and the seller of labor are suffi-
ciently satisfied with each other's offer to say, "I accept."' 8
Defenders of market wage differentials also argue that free
markets encourage allocative efficiency. Free markets are effi-
cient because the demand for labor is derived from the demand
for goods and services.' 9 The pursuit of profit motivates the
producer to supply those goods and services most desired by
consumers. To respond to consumer needs, labor must be
purchased. Buyers of labor offer to pay the prospective em-
ployee the market value of the output which the employee can
produce in a given time period. Ultimately, therefore, consum-
ers' wishes as to what should be produced essentially deter-
16. See Thomas Morgan, The Deregulation Bandwagon: Too Far, Too Fast?
2 J. L. & Com. 1, 2 (1982).
17. See Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets 45-48 (1977) (description of
the coercive aspects of market decisionmaking). Lindblom's treatment of free-
dom as a complex, divisible attribute of social mechanisms is particularly help-
ful in pointing out the ideological content of the traditional association of
markets with freedom and collective decisionmaking with coercion.
18. George Hildebrand, The Market System, in Comparable Worth: Issues
and Alternatives 85 (Robert Livernash ed. 1980).
19. Demand for goods and services is said to reflect consumer preferences.
See Mark Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Ques-
tions Are Not All Economic, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1283 (1981) (thoughtful attack on
the appropriateness of allocative efficiency as a policy criterion).
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mine the wage paid to each type of worker.20
To summarize, the notion of allocative efficiency postu-
lates that society's scarce resources must be channeled to their
most productive uses; consumers express, through the market,
what are and what are not productive uses; profit-inspired pro-
ducers respond by directing society's resources to these most
desired ends; and employees' labor, being one component of so-
ciety's scarce resources, is drawn away from less productive
uses (and less productive employers) into more productive
uses through the mechanisms of rising market wages and so-
cial mobility. Thus, impersonal market forces guide resources
to their most efficient use.
Finally, defenders of the existing market wage pattern
claim that wages are fair. Wages are fair because no person is
paid unless she demonstrates to some employer (buyer of la-
bor) that she has some potential output that the employer will
be able to sell. The greater the dollar value of her prospective
output, the higher her income will be. This link between pro-
ductivity and income is seductively simple and appealing.
Those who defend existing income differentials suggest that
each individual selects both the amount of training and the atti-
tudes toward hard work which she must eventually attempt to
sell.21 Hence, the market is said to be fair in the sense that the
individual employee voluntarily enters a particular wage
category.22
This benign portrayal of the processes determining wages
morally validates the market defense to comparable worth
claims. If, for example, market decisions were indeed as be-
nign in their effects as the neoclassical labor market perspec-
tive suggests, then comparable worth complainants might
justifiably be defined as envious workers wishing to gain from
the courts that which the market value of their labor could
never provide. Actual labor markets, however, are exceedingly
more complex than neoclassical labor market theory supposes.
Neoclassical theory provides one model of what labor markets
might be like. Regrettably, those who use this model to make
policy statements ignore the axiom that a map or model is not
20. Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action 270-72 (1949).
21. See Ronald Ehrenberg & Robert Smith, Modern Labor Economics 230-41
(1982) (discussion of the choice among leisure, work, or schooling as a matter
of personal preference. The many constraints on that choice, such as discrimi-
nation or family income, are conveniently ignored).
22. See David Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Unemployment 37 (1972).
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the same as the terrain it hopes to describe. 23 Whatever the
"typical" labor markets are like, some groups benefit from the
wage decisions made in those markets while others do not. Not
surprisingly, men who benefit from the existing system of mar-
ket wages understandably embrace the neoclassical labor mar-
ket model because it provides a moral justification for their
economic power relative to that of women.
B. Underlying Assumptions
Like most economic theories, neoclassical labor market
theory requires that certain assumptions be made for the
model to operate in its prescribed manner. The theory's por-
trayal of the operation of society is accurate only to the extent
that the theory's underlying assumptions reflect the real opera-
tion of the market. Inaccurate assumptions render the theoreti-
cal conclusions suspect. Focusing on these assumptions
provides the groundwork for matching "the market" as neoclas-
sical theory describes it to actual industry characteristics. The
closer the match, the more credible the resulting policy claims,
including the repudiation of comparable worth claims in those
labor markets where neoclassical assumptions might be empiri-
cally reliable.
Before examining these assumptions about the nature of
labor markets, workers and counsel responding to the market
defense should reflect on two threshold beliefs shared by those
who proffer markets as an allocative device. First, the market
defense relies on the belief that existing income distribution is
a proper starting point for determining who should be victori-
ous in specific wage bargains.24 This belief is central to any
market defense because the demand curves for the buyer of la-
bor's product reflect a particular income distribution: the ex-
isting one.25 Altering income distribution thereby changes the
23. Lester Thurow, Why Do Economists Disagree? 29 Dissent 176, 181 (1982).
24. See Louis Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis
and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1817, 1822-23 (1982) (dis-
cussion of the tendency of those who apply neoclassical economic theory to ig-
nore distributional impacts of their propositions).
25. See Paul Wachtel, The Poverty of Affluence 269-71 (1983).
A demand curve for any good or service expresses the amount of money
consumers will spend on that good or service. Every consumer has many
wants. Only a subset of those wants, however, are reflected on demand curves.
The amount of income one possesses, among other things, determines the size
of the disparity between wants and demand. Thus, the legitimacy of any set of
demand curves depends on our satisfaction with the income distribution that
determines their level
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demand curves constructed on that pattern of dollar votes. 26
Changed demand curves result in new income differentials
transformed to reflect the new distributional starting point.27
Embracing the current division of income among groups is thus
a precondition for allegiance to the legitimacy of current wage
bargains.
A second belief held by those who defend market out-
comes is that the rational employer and employee will each
shape wage and employment decisions by calculating the net
pecuniary benefit to herself. That economic actors might be
motivated by altruism, community well-being, or moral princi-
ples is dubbed "remote" by market advocates. 28 In neoclassical
economic theory, human nature is not necessarily devoid of
moral content; instead, moral actions are defined in terms of ef-
ficient and individualistic calculations. The moral employee or
seller of labor acts to maximize her income; the moral em-
ployer or purchaser of labor acts to maximize her profit.29 This
belief is essential to the efficiency claims of market outcomes.
Supposedly, the employer always searches for the most pro-
ductive employee, and the employee readily leaves a job when
the wage lags behind the market value of her marginal output.
These two presumptive beliefs relate to the underlying na-
ture of labor market participants. One may question the legiti-
macy of these beliefs. In so doing, one may argue against the
neoclassical market defense regardless of the characteristics of
the particular market whose outcomes are being challenged in
a comparable worth action.
A second level of beliefs, held by market defenders, per-
tains to the structural organization of particular markets. The
structural assumptions include:
1. All product and factor markets are fully competitive
and free.
2. There is extensive sharing of information among all
buyers and sellers of labor.
26. Lester Thurow, The Illusion of Economic Necesity, in Value Judgment
and Income Distribution 250-53 (Robert Solo & Charles Anderson eds. 1981).
27. M. Neil Browne & John Hoag, Understanding Economic Analysis, ch. 10(1983).
2& See John Braithwaite, The Limits of Economism in Controlling Harmful
Corporate Conduct, 16 L & Soc'y Rev. 481 (1981-82) (discussion of the negative
impacts of this moral relativism in regulating hazardous industrial practices).
29. See Edward Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power 9-10 (1981)
(criticism of this profit-maximizing hypothesis).
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3. The factors of production, that is, labor and materials,
are perfectly mobile.
4. The productivity of every individual can be operation-
ally measured.
When these characteristics are not empirically observed, but
only hypothetically assumed, the theory suffers in its ability to
explain reality. Consequently, those who employ a flawed the-
ory to defend market outcomes lose argumentative credibility
and, in a court of law, do not deserve judicial respect. This
analysis now focuses on the importance of each of these four
assumed market characteristics.
1. Competitiveness of Product and Factor Markets
Neoclassical theory assumes that product and factor mar-
kets are competitive. 30 If product markets are to be non-coer-
cive and fair allocative mechanisms, sellers must be powerless
to demand a price that exceeds the minimum value of what
they sell. 3 1 Because relative prices represent the comparative
value of resources, a seller who can violate this criterion causes
the market to distort the real value of the resource, thereby dis-
rupting allocative efficiency. A buyer cannot maximize her wel-
fare if prices reflect power rather than the value prescribed by
consumer sovereignty!3 2 Moreover, those sellers who possess
market power guide market decisions rather than respond to
them as neoclassical theory assumes.33
Contrary to economic reality, neoclassical labor market
theory assumes that participants make wage decisions in a
power vacuum.34 Buyers and sellers of labor are assumed pow-
erless to set wages that violate the correlation between produc-
tivity and income. If the employer pays employees less than
their worth, higher wages elsewhere will lure the employees
30. In economic theory, factor markets are those markets which distribute
the factors of production among producers. Labor and raw materials are both
examples of factors of production. In factor markets, producers are the pur-
chasers of labor and raw materials. Correlatively, product markets are those
markets which distribute goods and services to consumers. In product mar-
kets, producers are the sellers and consumers are the purchasers.
31. Browne & Hoag, supra note 27, at ch. 8.
32. See Robert Dahl, After the Revolution 121 (1970). Dahl focuses on the
"optical illusion" required to hypothesize the giant firm as a private enterprise.
Dahl ridicules the tendency of neoclassical economists to reduce the complex
modern firm to the single, independent, and rational entrepreneur.
33. See Barbara Deckard & Howard Sherman, Monopoly Power and Sex
Discrimination, 4 Pol. & Soc'y 475, 478-80 (1974).
34. John Kenneth Galbraith, Power and the Usefid Economist, 63 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1, 6 (1973).
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away. If the employer pays employees more than their worth,
the employer will realize no profit. As long as labor markets
are competitive, the employer has no choice but to pay employ-
ees what the market says they are worth. Since product mar-
kets are competitive, the employer has no surplus to pay
workers in excess of the competitive market value of their mar-
ginal output.35 Thus, the market defense contains a tone of dis-
may that market wage differentials are even questioned.30
This assumption of powerless economic agents also sup-
ports the idea that market exchanges are voluntary. When two
powerless groups interact, the outcome reflects objective, im-
personal considerations of resource value - there are no
rogues or scheming manipulators in this scenario, only passive
recipients of price and wage data determined by technological
considerations and consumer tastes. No one is forced to pay or
accept a particular wage by a more powerful party, so the wage
is the outcome of a voluntary process.
2. Widespread Availability of Labor Market Information
Rational economic calculations depend on the existence of
necessary information.37 Both the employer and employee
must have considerable information about a particular job to
match precisely the employee's wages with the value of the em-
ployee's marginal output and simultaneously to provide the
employer with the optimal bargain consistent with the profit
maximization objective. Many types of information, including
the productivity of all pertinent potential employees, all alter-
native wages available to every employee, quality of alternative
jobs in other geographic regions, and the market value of an
employee output38 must be considered prior to such wage set-
ting. Without this data, market defenders' characterization of a
wage decision as objective and rational is absurd.
On both efficiency and equity grounds, lack of information
35. Richard Lipsey, Peter Steiner & Douglas Purvis, Economics 341, 343 (7th
ed. 1984).
36. John Bunzel, To Each According to Her Worth?, Public Interest, Spring,
1982, at 77, 81.
37. See J.P. Golbert & Paul Lowenstein, The Court and the Marketplace:
Who Should Regulate Whom, 34 Baylor L. Rev. 39, 44-45 (1982).
38. This list is by no means complete or exhaustive. See Lester Thurow,
Generating Inequality 220-21 (1975) (knowledge is never perfect regarding fu-
ture conditions and substantial ignorance will often exist about current
conditions).
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in a labor market damages the market defense. 39 Allocative ef-
ficiency evolves from market values that signal to resource
users the relative worth of alternative resources. These signals
become confused when they arise from serious information de-
ficiencies on the part of the parties to the exchange. Wage dif-
ferentials created in an atmosphere of sustained lack of
information cannot validly measure the social worth of differ-
ent groups' labor.
In a market characterized by a lack of information, to
claim that an employee freely chose a particular line of work
and made the corresponding investment decisions is, at best,
unfair. Recall that the link between productivity and income
appears fair only if the prospective employee makes calculated
training decisions leading to a particular occupation. 40 In ef-
fect, the young worker decides the future wage that she will
earn through foresight. Certain groups in our society are better
informed than others about the pay-offs from alternative train-
ing. This means that market wage differentials eventually re-
flect a systematic inequity due to the availability of information
about occupational opportunities. For instance, many women
may opt only for jobs in employment categories having a high
proportion of female employees. These particular occupations
may be precisely those in which discrimination against women
is pervasive. Since women see female role models in only cer-
tain occupations, they may limit their selection of training slots
to a tiny subset of those chosen by others having the same po-
tential productivity. Any wage that results from such a con-
stricted choice loses its moral legitimacy.
3. Mobility of the Factors of Production
The ultimate form of expression available to the unhappy
39. Thomas McGarity & Elinor Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment
Screening, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 999, 1015 (1981).
40. The neoclassical model explains the training decisions of prospective
employees as an investment decision similar to that made regarding other capi-
tal assets. Neoclassical theorists use this human capital theory to explain wage
differences. See Solomon Polachek, Occupational Segregation: An Alternative
Hypothesis, 5 J. Contemp. Bus. 1 (1976) (an explanation of human capital the-
ory). Polachek concludes that the theory fails to account for the bulk of occu-
pational sex segregation. See also Paula England, The Failure of Human
Capital Theory to Explain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. Hum. Re-
sources 358 (1982). Yet another study found that the human capital theory is
less powerful than a structural-stratification theory in explaining variance in
earnings for a national sample of manual workers. Robert Bibb & William
Form, The Effects of Industria4 Occupationa4 and Sex Stratification on Wages
in Blue-Collar Markets, 55 Soc. Forces 974 (1977).
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employee is exit. Neoclassical labor market theory ascribes
powerful efficiency effects to the market mechanism because it
presumes that the market wage cannot persist below the value
of an employee's output. Discrimination can exist temporarily,
but soon some other profit hungry employer will lure the justifi-
ably dissatisfied employee to a workplace where her true value
is appreciated. In reality, this may not be the case. Many em-
ployees will not abandon a job that pays less than the value of
marginal output. Cultural or pecuniary reasons, as well as an
employee's failure to perceive the discrimination, cause this
immobility. Under these circumstances, wage inequities per-
sist.41 Thus, one basis for resisting a market defense to compa-
rable worth claims is to highlight the immobility of the workers
whose wages are being analyzed.
The effect of macroeconomic conditions on workers' ex-
pectations about mobility in various occupational classifications
must also be examined before accepting the argument that
market wages exist without continuous sale of labor at less
than marginal value. As indicated previously, the market de-
fense gathers moral strength by portraying wage decisions as
voluntary. Because a worker remains in her position, neoclas-
sical theory presumes that she is content with her current in-
come. If she were not content, she would voluntarily move to a
different job. Macroeconomic conditions, however, also affect
the amount of worker mobility in any given market. In a period
of high unemployment and persistent recession, for example,
workers move from job to job less often than under more pros-
perous macroeconomic conditions. Macroeconomic conditions
have a definite effect on the amount and degree of mobility that
can realistically be expected from workers. Yet, no worker con-
trols the macroeconomic conditions affecting her. Mobility,
therefore, is not simply a matter of individual choice in society,
contrary to what neoclassical theory assumes.
4. Measurability of Individual Productivity
For wages to serve as an accurate measure of the value of
a worker's output, the individual worker must have a particular
productivity that both the employer and the employee can
measure and then compare to the productivity of other employ-
ees.42 This assumption is especially important because critics
41. Levitan, Mangum & Marshall, supra, note 7, at 116.
42. In reality, productivity is less an individual phenomenon than it is a
joint interactive effort. See Wilburn Manuel, Productivity Experiences at
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of comparable worth actions repeatedly make invidious com-
parisons between the precise measures of relative worth "de-
termined" in the labor markets and the nebulous nature of
comparable worth.4 3 If market measures of worker value are to
be accorded operational superiority, they must be based on dis-
crete productivity calculations.44 A sound market defense can-
not rest merely on the deductive and circular argument that
wages measure productivity and productivity is measured by
wages.
Fairness of market incomes depends on the productivity-
income nexus. If an employer does not make the marginal pro-
ductivity calculations in the manner presumed by neoclassical
labor market theory, the employer cannot logically rely on the
market defense in comparable worth actions. Those defending
market compensation systems argue that despite the fact that
productivity calculations are not made, the market determines
relative wages as if the calculations had been made. This argu-
ment, however, depends on the existence of competitive mar-
kets because the neoclassical theory assumes that no firm can
exist in the long run if it pays a wage either less or greater than
the value of the marginal product of its employees.
This analysis emphasizes an understanding of neoclassical
market assumptions, rather than an empirical evaluation of
their accuracy. The empirical accuracy of any particular as-
sumption depends on the particular labor market in which the
comparable worth claim is made. Consequently, the validity of
a particular assumption may vary greatly among different mar-
kets. For this reason, this analysis avoids generalizations about
the empirical accuracy of the separate assumptions. Such gen-
eralizations would be inappropriately abstract. Instead, this
Nucor, in Productivity Improvement 49 (Vernon Buehler & Y. Krishna Shetty
eds. 1981). Measuring an individual's productivity would provide a meaningful
comparative yardstick of worker value only if discrete marginal output were at-
tributable to each individual worker. See also, David Macarov, Worker Produc-
tivity 12, 17 (1982). Almost without exception, productivity figures are
generated from gross output data divided by the number of employee hours
worked. Such data loses credibility as a means of comparing the value of alter-
native labor units when one considers that actual human labor may take credit
for less than one-third of the numerator in the resulting productivity ratio.
43. George Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in Comparable Worth: Issues
and Alternatives 33-37 (E. Robert Livernash ed. 1980); Schwab, Job Evaluation
and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in Comparable Worth: Issues and Al-
ternatives 58-59 (E. Robert Livernash ed. 1980); Lindsay, supra note 8, at 31.
44. See Harry Magdoff, The Economists' New Clothes, 234 Nation 359-61
(1982) (criticism of the use of productivity indices on the grounds that they are
imaginary).
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analysis suggests important dimensions that anyone evaluating
a market defense should investigate. As Barbara Norris points
out, comparable worth is not merely a means to achieve pay
equality. Comparable worth is also a doctrine that requires
employers to open their particular wage pattern to public in-
spection and to justify explicit wages using job-related crite-
ria.45 By requiring employers to open their wage determination
processes to examination, comparable worth doctrine permits
courts to apply economic theory to actual situations. If an em-
ployer attempts to defend his wage disparities on the basis of
neoclassical market theory, then the court must be convinced
that the actual labor market in which the employer participates
fits the hypothetical labor market in neoclassical theory. Only
where a particular wage pattern was actually created in a man-
ner that follows the market model used by those opposing com-
parable worth claims, can that defense have any justification.
II. Labor Market Theories: Alternatives to the Neoclassical Model
The neoclassical concept of the wage as a clearing device
which balances the profit-maximizing urges of buyers of labor
with the income-maximizing efforts of workers has not gone un-
challenged.46 Critics of neoclassical labor market theory tend
first to praise the logical qualities of the model and then criti-
cize the theory as artificial and inapplicable to most labor mar-
ket decisions. 47 Other theories of labor market behavior are
constructed on different sets of assumptions than those under-
lying neoclassical labor market theory.46 Not ironically, oppo-
nents of comparable worth claims avoid the alternative
theories, even though these theories employ assumptions more
45. Norris, supra note 3, at 756-57.
46. See Jobs for Disadvantaged Workers: The Economics of Employment
Subsidies (Robert Haveman & John Palmer eds. 1982) (several articles apply-
ing non-neoclassical labor market theories to the measurement of effects gener-
ated by governmental employment subsidies). This book illustrates the
growing awareness that a multiplicity of reasonable perspectives can aid analy-
sis of labor market behavior.
47. See Women, Work, and Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value 44-45
(Donald Treiman & Heidi Hartmann eds. 1981).
48. See Lester Thurow, Generating Inequality (1975) (enumeration of the
many labor market anomalies that neoclassical labor market theory fails to ex-
plain). The distribution of income, for example, is more unequal than is the
distribution of qualitative measures of "ability" such as IQ, physical attributes,
and educational attainment. This reality conflicts with the result projected by
the productivity/income nexus in neoclassical theory, that the qualitatively
most productive employees will earn the highest incomes. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2:473
19841 MARKET WAGES AND COMPARABLE WORTH 487
closely approximating the real behavior of the market. They do
so because these alternative theories do not advance the mar-
ket defense. Those who use market defenses to comparable
worth claims rely exclusively on neoclassical labor market the-
ory because neoclassical theory provides the strongest support
for rejecting judicial and legislative "tampering" with market
wages. Consequently, comparable worth claimants should fa-
miliarize themselves with alternative theories that explain the
wage determination process. Given the fact that no single eco-
nomic theory is universally accepted, the courtroom is an ex-
cellent forum for proposing the merits of alternative thought,
especially in the context of existing comparable worth doctrine.
This section briefly highlights a few alternatives to neo-
classical labor market theory in order to illustrate different atti-
tudes toward existing wage differentials. This description may
inform those who respond to comparable worth claims that la-
bor economists are not unified in their understanding of the
wage determination process. Knowledge of alternative models
provides a foundation from which to perceive the strengths and
weaknesses of a particular market defense as well as to estab-
lish the validity of comparable worth claims.
To begin with, several shared characteristics typify alter-
native labor market theories. Most noticeably, they deny the
realism of many of the neoclassical assumptions analyzed in
Part I. Persuaded by the many cumbersome qualifications of
neoclassical theory, advocates of alternative models are con-
vinced that neoclassical doctrine cannot realistically explain in-
come differentials. For instance, power plays a key role in
determining wages in each of the non-neoclassical labor market
models.49 Consequently, non-neoclassical theories question the
legitimacy of initial power distributions and the need for collec-
tive, non-market participation in wage choices. Another belief
common to these theories is that the existing income distribu-
tion is unfair.50 Thus, these theories provide comparable worth
claimants with a counterargument to the market defense which
is straightforward and based upon the real operation of the
market.
Perhaps the most significant difference between neoclassi-
49. Recall that neoclassical theory assumes that market participants are
powerless. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
50. See Glen Cain, The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to
Orthodox Theory: A Survey, 14 J. Econ. Lit. 1215 (1976). Recall that neoclassi-
cal theory assumes that the initial income distribution is fair. See supra notes
24-27 and accompanying text.
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cal and alternative labor market theories is that alternative the-
ories do not presume that there is a monolithic labor market.
Instead, alternative theories suggest the existence of several
forms of labor markets, each of which varies considerably in
structure. In other words, the neoclassical assumptions ap-
proximate actual conditions in so few labor markets that the ar-
guments stemming from that model lack credibility. In most
markets, a different set of assumptions is required to explain
market behavior. For example, certain external labor markets
do resemble the market form analyzed by the neoclassical
model.5 1 Internal labor markets,5 2 however, do not comport
with neoclassical theory because the transfer from one job slot
to another is not effectuated by a bidding process whereby
competing employees attempt to attain the position by taking a
lower wage than other qualified employees. 53 In internal labor
markets, employers do not, except under conditions of financial
exigency, reduce wages when the demand for their output falls,
nor do they increase wages when the demand for labor rises.54
Contract provisions, worker morale, and long-run efficiency
considerations combine to prevent the wage from functioning
as the neoclassical equilibrating device.55
Two types of alternative labor market theories illustrate
the perspectives of such theories. The first type categorizes the
labor market into distinct subdivisions. The dual labor market
theory, for example, explains the different characteristics of
each market subdivision according to the different treatment of
workers. Another example of this first type, the segmented la-
bor market theory, recognizes the infeasibility of workers in
one segment of the market freely moving into a better segment.
A second type of alternative labor market theory is exemplified
by the job competition model of a labor market. This model
51. External labor markets are those in which firms hire employees from a
pool of workers outside the firm itself. In such markets, firms are in direct com-
petition with other potential employers so discrimination is more difficult to
maintain. Lloyd Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations 96 (8th ed.
1982).
52. Internal labor markets are those in which employers fill job vacancies
from within the firm having the vacancy. Daniel Hamermesh & Albert Rees,
The Economics of Work and Pay 177 (3d ed. 1984).
53. See Peter Doeringer & Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Man-
power Analysis (1971) and Francine Blau, Equal Pay in the Office (1977) (dis-
cussion of the significance of internal labor markets for the wage setting
process).
54. Levitan, Mangum & Marshall, supra note 7, at 104.
55. Michael Piore, Unemployment and Inflation: An Alternative View, in
Unemployment and Inflation: Institutionalist and Structuralist Views 6
(Michael Piore ed. 1979).
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posits that wages are attached to jobs, not to workers them-
selves or to the amount of training that they have undergone.
In this model, the concept of the wage as a market clearing de-
vice is virtually nonexistent. Thus, comparative access to job
positions is the key to an understanding of relative wages. Ac-
cess, not willingness to accept lower wages, determines the
type of jobs available to women.
Dual labor market theory and segmented labor market
theories are the first alternatives to the neoclassical model.
The former argues that there are essentially two different sec-
tors of labor markets, which it labels primary and secondary la-
bor markets.5 6 Primary labor markets are characterized by
relatively high wages, career ladders, and employment security.
Secondary labor markets are characterized by poor working
conditions, few opportunities for advancement, high turnover
rates,5 7 and, especially important in comparable worth claims, a
highly personalized relationship between supervisors and
workers.5 8 This latter characteristic allows the supervisor
broad latitude to determine wages on the basis of arbitrary
judgments. 9 Mobility from the secondary to the primary sec-
tor is so rare that these markets function virtually
independently.
Segmented labor market theories arose from a dissatisfac-
tion with the bipolar dual labor market model. They form a
second model of the first type of alternative labor market the-
ory. In the segmented labor market model, there are many par-
ticularized markets, each comprised of a largely homogenous
group of employees competing for jobs with relatively narrow
characteristics. Segmentation or the isolation of one labor mar-
ket from another prohibits wage differentials from playing their
allocative role as signals of relative resource value. Proponents
of the segmented model believe that the labor market is far
more complex than can be captured in a labor market model
with only two forms.60
56. Characteristics of the secondary labor market match the effects of job
segregation. See Ruth Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. Mich. J.L Ref. 397, 400 (1979).
57. See Wendy Wolf & Rachel Rosenfeld, Sex Structure of Occupations and
Job Mobility, 56 Soc. Forces 823 (1978) (analysis of the comparative turnover
rates of men and women and the resulting impact on wage differentials).
58. Levitan, Mangum & Marshall, supra note 7, at 108.
59. See Elizabeth Almquist, Minorities, Gender, and Work 179 (1979) (dis-
cussion of the impact of this discretion on female-male wage differentials).
60. David Gordon, Richard Edwards & Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Di-
vided Workers ix (1982).
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A second type of alternative to the neoclassical labor mar-
ket theory is the job competition theory. Under this theory,
workers do not compete against each other in terms of wages.
Instead, the demand for labor is a function of workplace and
personality characteristics that make workers differentially
trainable. This model views the employer as unable to bid on
workers with assorted labor market skills because skills de-
velop primarily on the job.6' In such a setting, wage competi-
tion is undesirable because it creates disincentives for workers
to train one another. Dynamic efficiency requires that seniority
and other administrative criteria be used to determine ad-
vancement. The job competition model acknowledges that fac-
tors over which an individual has little control determine her
income. Macroeconomic conditions and the extent to which
other workers have or acquire characteristics that make them
easily trainable exemplify uncontrollable factors.62
The job competition model also recognizes that jobs, not
individuals, possess productivities.63 Each individual possesses
an array of potential productivities dependent on which job she
possesses. If this latter contention is accurate, a particular pro-
ductivity/income nexus becomes one of many possible links to
a resource's social worth, not the single indicator as suggested
by neoclassical labor market theory. A woman's productivity is
not something intrinsic to herself, instead, it is a reflection of
the jobs to which she is permitted access.
The logic of these alternative labor market theories is in-
ductive.64 That characteristic contrasts with the essentially de-
ductive quality of neoclassical theory.65 This distinction
reflects the necessity, in neoclassical theory, of trying to match
the assumptions to the specific labor market. Dual labor mar-
ket theorists and other theorists found it necessary to modify
the neoclassic model of labor market behavior by drawing their
theory from observable facts. There are many variations in la-
bor markets. Workers and counsel analyzing market defenses
to comparable worth claims must systematically ask whether
61. Lester Thurow, The Zero Sum Society 55-57 (1980).
62. Lester Thurow, A Job Competition Model, in Unemployment and Infla-
tion: Institutionalist and Structuralist Views 17 (Michael Piore ed. 1979).
63. Id. at 18.
64. David Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Unemployment 43-44 (1972); Pi-
ore, supra note 55, at 5.
65. See John Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 12 Sw. U. L Rev. 335, 337 (1980-81).
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the market being challenged strongly resembles "the market"
to which the defense implicitly refers.
Conclusion
No monolith called "the market" exists.66 Rather, markets
possess different forms and structures. Each market has cer-
tain predictable results in terms of who does and does not ben-
efit from its operation. Consequently, a vehicle such as "the
market defense," when used haphazardly and without regard
for the characteristics of the specific market being challenged
in comparable worth cases, can never provide an intellectually
satisfactory defense for the wages of that market.67 In some
markets, claims of efficiency and fairness attributed to existing
compensation systems may be appropriate if the actual market
in question resembles the abstract idealization of markets that
is presumed when making the attribution.68 The market de-
fense, however, more frequently functions as a rather blatant
apology for the status quo.69 It is trotted out, reflexively, to de-
fend every outcome of a market interaction that even the most
vigorous imagination cannot confuse with the ideal form of
markets that activates the defense.
66. " he market", as an analytical device for justifying particular market
wages, frequently reflects what Whitehead termed "the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness." See Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason
222 (1976). The habitual deployment of hypothetical, idealized markets results
in their being confused with observations of actual markets.
67. David Reisman, Tawney, Galbraith & Smith, State and Welfare 1-9
(1982).
68. See Schwab, supra note 43, at 52-55.
69. Warren Samuels, The Historical Treatment of the Problem of Value Judg-
ments: An Interpretation, in Value Judgment and Income Distribution 62-64
(Robert Solo & Charles Anderson eds. 1981).

